#### **Empirical Analysis of the Spot Market Implications of Price-Elastic Demand**

paper presented at

#### 24th Annual North American Conference of the USAEE/IAEE Capital Hilton Hotel, Washington, DC

08 – 10 July 2004

# Afzal Siddiqui

**University College Dublin** 

afzal.siddiqui@ucd.ie - +353.1.716.8091 Co-authors: Emily Bartholomew (Berkeley Lab) and Chris Marnay (Berkeley Lab)

Research supported by the Business Research Programme of the Michael Smurfit Graduate School of Business at University College Dublin





- Background and Objective
- Theory of Price-Elastic Demand
- Overview of New York Control Area
- Empirical Methodology and Results
- Conclusions







- Vertical integration: all electricity functions provided by regulated investor-owned utility (IOU)
- Deregulation: introduction of competition into sectors of the electricity industry that are amenable to it
- This has resulted in divestiture of IOUs' generation assets
- In the U.S., deregulation process has separated the sectors with "natural monopoly" characteristics from the competitive ones
- Transmission sector to be controlled by independent system operator (ISO)







- Most of the effort has been directed towards the supply side with few demand-side initiatives
- Deregulated electricity markets, therefore, differ from others for commodities because end-use consumers are still subject to constant retail rates
- End-users do not perceive real-time fluctuations in the wholesale price
- Consequently, they are unable to adjust their consumption accordingly
- Theoretically, price elasticity is desirable, but how much of an impact would it make?
- Use data from New York market to quantify the benefits of price elasticity from a policymaking perspective

ĥŇ

លាក់ណាតិជាផ្ល

BERKELEY LAD




- Background and Objective
- Theory of Price-Elastic Demand
- Overview of New York Control Area
- Empirical Methodology and Results
- Conclusions





#### **Theory of Price-Elastic Demand**





#### **Theory of Price-Elastic Demand**

- Definition of price elasticity:  $\eta(p^*, q^*) \equiv \left| \frac{p^*}{q^*} \frac{\partial Q_d}{\partial p} \right|$  Linear inverse-demand specification:  $Q_d(p) = a bp$ , where a > 0 and
- *b>0*, then  $\eta(p,q) = \frac{p}{q}b$  If both demand and supply are linear, then what are the comparative
- statics resulting from changes in *b*?
- Both the equilibrium price and quantity decrease, but at a diminishing rate:  $\frac{\partial p}{\partial b} < 0$   $\frac{\partial^2 p}{\partial b^2} > 0$   $\frac{\partial q}{\partial b} < 0$   $\frac{\partial^2 q}{\partial b^2} > 0$
- Implication: do not need much elasticity in order to have an effect

#### Try to quantify this feature for the New York industry





- Background and Objective
- Theory of Price-Elastic Demand
- Overview of New York Control Area
- Empirical Methodology and Results
- Conclusions





#### **New York Control Area**



លាយបានបានបាន




# **New York Control Area**

- New York ISO (NYISO) manages the entire grid in the state and operates markets that provide half of the electricity
- State is divided up into eleven congestion zones, each of which consists of many generation buses
- Locational-based marginal price (LBMP) is calculated for each zone and bus
- LBMP depends on intersection of supply offer and demand bid stacks
- We construct generator offer stacks by adding individual ones horizontally
- Assume no congestion or demand-side response





#### **New York Control Area**








- Background and Objective
- Theory of Price-Elastic Demand
- Overview of New York Control Area
- Empirical Methodology and Results
- Conclusions





#### **Methodology**

• Objective: use NYISO data for year 2002 to construct hourly supply stacks and determine the potential impact of real-time pricing





### **Methodology**

• By how much to increase the slope at each increment?

$$0 = b_0 < b_1 < \dots < b_i < \dots < b_{n-1} = \min\left\{ b \middle| \begin{array}{l} a - bp = \min_p Q_s(p) \right\} \\ b_j = \min\left\{ b \middle| \begin{array}{l} \frac{a - k_{n-j}}{b} = c_{n-j} \end{array} \right\} \Rightarrow b_j = \frac{a - k_{n-j}}{c_{n-j}}, 1 \le j \le n-1 \end{array}$$

• If the supply stack's step sizes are small enough, then the increments to the slope are also small


• Allows approximate calculation of the slopes  $\frac{\partial p}{\partial b}$  and  $\frac{\partial q}{\partial b}$ :

លលំហល់លំហំពីបំ


$$\frac{\partial p}{\partial b}\Big|_{\begin{pmatrix}p_i^*, q_i^*\end{pmatrix}} = \lim_{\Delta b_i \to 0} \frac{\Delta p_i^*}{\Delta b_i} \approx \frac{p_i^* - p_{i-1}^*}{b_i - b_{i-1}}, i = 0, \dots, n - 1$$
$$\frac{\partial q}{\partial b}\Big|_{\begin{pmatrix}p_i^*, q_i^*\end{pmatrix}} = \lim_{\Delta b_i \to 0} \frac{\Delta q_i^*}{\Delta b_i} \approx \frac{q_i^* - q_{i-1}^*}{b_i - b_{i-1}}, i = 0, \dots, n - 1$$




### **Methodology**



#### Results



#### Results





#### Results

Scenario	Average Elasticity Required	Standard Deviation of Required Elasticity	Corresponding Average Demand (MW)	Average Percentage Decrease in Demand
25% Decrease in Price	0.23	0.12	13004	18%
50% Decrease in Price	0.53	0.19	10411	34%
75% Decrease in Price	0.87	0.31	8483	46%





- Background and Objective
- Theory of Price-Elastic Demand
- Overview of New York Control Area
- Empirical Methodology and Results
- Conclusions







- Deregulated electricity industries suffer from a lack of demand-side response
- Attempt to quantify the effect of real-time pricing on the equilibrium prices and quantities in the NYISO control area for year 2002
- Results confirm the diminishing marginal returns of elasticity
- Most of the feasible potential reductions in the price can be achieved at levels of elasticity that are exhibited by large consumers
- Directions for future research: non-linear demand curves, supply shocks, forward market implications of real-time pricing



