Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0
Author-Name:  Yihsu Chen, Makoto Tanaka, and Afzal S. Siddiqui
Title:  Market Power with Tradable Performance-Based CO2 Emission Standards in the Electricity Sector
Classification-JEL: F0
Volume:  Volume 39
Issue:  Number 6
Year:  2018
Abstract:  The U.S. Clean Power Plan stipulates a state-specific performance-based CO2 emission standard, delegating states with considerable flexibility for using either a tradable performance-based or a mass-based permit program. This paper analyzes these two standards under imperfect competitive. We limit our attention to (1) short-run analyses and (2) a situation in which all states are subject to the same type of standard. We show that while the cross-subsidy inherent in the performance-based standard might effectively reduce power prices, it could also inflate energy consumption. A dominant firm with a relatively clean endowment under the performance-based standard would be able to manipulate the electricity market as well as to elevate permit prices, which might worsen market outcomes compared to its mass-based counterpart. On the other hand, the "cross-subsidy" could be the dominant force leading to a higher social welfare if the leader has a relatively dirty endowment.
Handle: RePEc:aen:journl:ej39-6-Chen
File-URL: http://www.iaee.org/en/publications/ejarticle.aspx?id=3255
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