Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0
Author-Name:  Sven-Olof Fridolfsson and Thomas P. Tangeras
Title:  Nuclear Capacity Auctions
Classification-JEL: F0
Volume:  Volume 36
Issue:  Number 3
Year:  2015
Abstract:  We propose nuclear capacity auctions as a means to correcting the incentives for investing in nuclear power. In particular, capacity auctions open the market for large-scale entry by outside firms. Requiring licensees to sell a share of capacity as virtual power plant contracts increases auction efficiency by mitigating incumbent producers' incentive to bid for market power. A motivating example is Sweden's policy reversal to allow new nuclear power to replace old reactors. 
Handle: RePEc:aen:journl:ej36-3-Tangeras
File-URL: http://www.iaee.org/en/publications/ejarticle.aspx?id=2635
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