Template-Type: ReDIF-Article 1.0
Author-Name:  Clifton T. Jones
Title:  OPEC Behaviour Under Falling Prices: Implications For Cartel Stability
Classification-JEL: F0
Pages:  117-130
Volume:  Volume 11
Issue:  Number 3
Year:  1990
Abstract:  The surprising extended decline in real oil prices during the 1980s has raised the question of OPEC's continued viability as a price-setting cartel. In response, Griffin's (1985) tests of alternative hypotheses about OPEC behaviour performed over a period of generally rising prices (1971:1-1983:III) are repeated for the more recent period of falling prices (1983:IV-198R•1V), yielding the same general conclusions: most OPEC members continue to behave in a 'partial market sharing" way, while most non-OPEC oil producers do not. Thus the evidence suggests that recent oil price reductions are more the result of deliberate output adjustments by the cartel than the unintentional outcome of a breakdown in cartel discipline on the way to eventual collapse.
Handle: RePEc:aen:journl:1990v11-03-a06
File-URL: http://www.iaee.org/en/publications/ejarticle.aspx?id=2019
File-Format: text/html
File-Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to IAEE members and subscribers.